

## Effect of Implemented Incentive and Punishment Policies to Combat Corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health

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**Abstract:** The study aimed to identify types of incentives and punishments implemented by the Palestinian Ministry of Health on the second category of employees, and the role of these incentives and punishments in combating corruption. The study used the analytical descriptive methodology. A questionnaire was distributed to a sample of (351) employees working in the Palestinian Ministry of Health. Using SPSS, the study revealed that incentives and punishments are not used effectively in the Palestinian Ministry of Health as a tool to combat the widely spreading corruption. The study recommended the activation of incentives and punishments as an effective tool to combat corruption.

**Key words:** incentives; punishments; corruption; the Palestinian Ministry of Health

### تأثير تطبيق سياسيات الحوافز والعقوبات في مواجهة الفساد في وزارة الصحة الفلسطينية

**ملخص:** تهدف الدراسة إلى التعرف على أشكال المحفزات والعقوبات المطبقة من قبل وزارة الصحة الفلسطينية على موظفيها من الطبقة الثانية ، والتعرف على دور هذه المحفزات والعقوبات في مواجهة الفساد. الدراسة استخدمت المنهج الوصفي التحليلي من خلال استبانة وزعت على عينة مكونة من 351 من موظفي وزارة الصحة الفلسطينية وتم تحليل الإستمارة من خلال برنامج SPSS حيث توصلت الدراسة إلى أن الحوافز والعقوبات غير مستخدمة بفعالية من قبل وزارة الصحة كأداة في مواجهة الفساد المنتشر جلياً في الوزارة وأوصت الدراسة بضرورة تفعيل دور الحوافز والعقوبات بشكل يستشعره الموظفون كأداة فاعلة في مواجهة الفساد.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** الحوافز، والعقوبات، الفساد، وزارة الصحة الفلسطينية.

### Introduction:

As the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) started its work in West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1993, it has worked under different rules of management that differs from the liberal-martial management. The role of oversight and control bodies were absent at the beginning which was the most important stage to start control and facing any type of managerial corruption (Coalition for Accountability and Integrity, 2009). Another problem appears in the Palestinian public sector is the effect of the high commitment to the social traditions which implies that people have to help their relatives and

friends and they cannot differentiate between helping close people and nepotism. The corruption became a normal part of the Palestinian public sector which harms all life's aspects. In addition, various published reports stated that tens of international NGOs played a significant role in encouraging corruption by using the funds given to the public institutions to serve its own interests and special agendas (Coalition for Accountability and Integrity, 2009).

Any organization aims to execute specific goals used to define the suitable reinforcements and punishments that can lead to integrate effective human recourses system (Abwe , 2008). On the other hand, any effective public human recourses system needs to have a clear-effective reinforcement and punishment policies (Hadeed, 2002). The public sector payment system depends mainly on basic salaries as a tool for compensation which is usually not related directly to any improvement or insufficiency in employee's performance. While the organization is not reinforcing improvement in performance, it is reinforcing poor performance and unethical behavior (Fisher, 2000).

One of the most important techniques to improve the performance in the public sector is to link employee's reinforcements and punishments to the overall performance of the institutions that they are working for (Abo-Bker, 2005). It is important for the employees to feel that they are related to their organizations that have to appreciate their efforts by making them feel special according to an un-financial manner (Reasoner, 2006). According to the Palestinian Civil Law, the employee can't get a financial reinforcement more than once each two year. Actually, here is no clear punishment policy for poor performance till the employee gets two annual reports on round with poor results (The Palestinian Civil Law, 1998).

On the first of January of the year 2010, the Palestinian General Personnel Council stated that it has 80064 employees at ministries in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 48.5% of them considered as the second category which has a substantial role in the over all performance of the public sector (General Personnel Council Report of 2010).

#### **Research Question and Hypothesis:**

The research studies generally the relationship between reinforcements' and punishments' impact on the corrupting level in the Palestinian public health organizations.

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### **The main Research Question is:**

*What is the impact of the reinforcements and punishments policies of anti-corruption implemented on the second category of the employees of the Ministry of Health?*

Also the research answers another secondary question including:

- What are the current reinforcements and punishments procedures used for the second category of employees?

### **The research studied the following hypothesis:**

1. There is a significant relationship between financial reinforcements applied for second category of employees and the corruption at level of (0.05).
2. There is a significant relationship between un-financial reinforcements applied for second category of employees and the corruption at level of (0.05).
3. There is a significant relationship between financial punishments applied for second category of employees and the corruption at level of (0.05).
4. There is a significant relationship between un-financial punishments applied for second category of employees and the corruption at level of (0.05).
5. There is a significant relationship between the period of experience spent in the public sector and the corrupted practices of the employee at level of (0.05%).
6. There is a significant relationship between the personal differences and the corrupted practices of the employee at level of (0.05%).

### **Research Objectives:**

The research aims to achieve multiple objectives to serve the different areas. These objectives could be identified as the following:

1. To identify the types of reinforcements and punishments implemented by Palestinian public sector.
2. To identify the extent to which these reinforcements and punishments are effective at the second category of employees.
3. To determine the role of these reinforcements and punishments in facing corruption at the second category of employees.
4. To draw conclusions and recommendations about how to reactivate these reinforcements and punishments.

### **Importance of the Research:**

The importance of the research comes from the rareness of the studies about the administrative mechanisms, techniques, and tools used by the Palestinian public sector to combat corruption, especially when it is related

to the human resources which is the most important resource in any system regardless of its type or environment. In addition, the research focuses on how the top management can reactivate the managerial reinforcement and punishment policies which were legislated by the Palestinian Civil Law, and use them as an effective tool to face the unacceptable behaviors of the second category of employees of the Ministry of Health. The research was conducted during a critical period of time as there are many calls for the reconditioning and reforming all the systems of the PNA. On the other hand, the research could be used as a base to conduct an advanced future research of how to improve such reinforcement and punishment policies to make them more effective and more suitable to the Palestinian context.

**Research Variables:**

The research conducts the following variables which have a direct relationship to the study:

- **Independent variables:**

1. The offered financial reinforcement for the employee.
2. The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee.
3. The offered financial punishments for the employee.
4. The offered un-financial punishments for the employee.
5. The period of experience spent in the public sector.
6. Personal differences between employees (sex, age, and education).

- **Dependent variables:**

1. Corrupt behavior of the public employee.
2. Anti-corrupt behavior of public employee.

**Methodology:**

The population of the research consists of all the second category employees in the Palestinian Ministry of Health, who represents 56.44% of the total public health employees. The second category jobs consist from all the specialized jobs in all different fields. Second category employees' job is to handle all the specialized tasks in all professions including medical, engineering, financial, economical, and social field. Only second category employees can occupy jobs which have managerial and supervision responsibilities as managers, heads of departments, and head of units (Palestinian Legislative Council, 1998).

**Literature Review:**

**Abdallah, W., and et al. (2009). Corruption in Health Sector: Evidence from Unofficial Consultation Fees in Bangladesh.**

The study aimed to investigate the factors that affect the unofficial payments made to the government doctors as consultation fees in Bangladesh. The study used the Household Income Expenditure Survey (HIES) conducted by

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Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) in 2005, and Directory of Health and Social Welfare for 2005, published by the BBS. The HIES 2005 included 10,080 households and 48,969 individuals while the survey contained income, employment and expenditure modules in addition to demographics, health and education modules. The study found that patients who live far from public health facilities are more likely to suffer from corrupt practices. The study recommends to increase staff members to reduce amount of unofficial fees paid and the incidence of corruption.

### **Vian, T. (2007). Review Of Corruption in The Health Sector: Theory, Methods and Interventions.**

The study investigated how corruption affects health care access and outcomes, and what can be done to combat corruption in the health sector. It examined the links between corruption and various aspects of management, financing and governance. The study found corruption is a complex problem which threatens health care access, equity and outcomes. The study recommended that there is an urgent need to identify and understand the root causes of corruption in each health sector to be able to face this difficult challenge. It clarified that more effective programs should be applied to close off opportunities, alleviate pressures and strengthen resistance to corruption.

### **Al-Aksh, A. (2007). The Effect of Reinforcement and Rewards System on Improving Performance of Employees in the Palestinian Ministries.**

The study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the reinforcement system in the Palestinian public sector; it also aimed to evaluate the role of these reinforcements on the performance of public employees. The study used the analytical descriptive methodology, SPSS and used a questionnaire for the sample which consisted of 346 employees who are working in managerial and supervisor positions in the Palestinian ministries. The study found that the effect of incentives and rewards system on improving the performance of the employees in PNA ministries is very weak, inactive and most of the employees don't have any idea about the system. The study recommends that the incentives system should be checked and reevaluated, updated to fit the expectations of the employees in the public sector, and increased for the competent and active employees.

### **Kolab, S. (2004). The Reality of Internal Monitoring in The Palestinian Public Sector.**

The study aimed to evaluate the application of the internal monitoring system in the Palestinian public sector and to examine the relationship between the internal monitoring system and corruption and poor performance. The study used the analytical descriptive methodology with

SPSS and used a questionnaire for the sample which consisted of 130 employees in 22 ministries. The study found that the weaknesses in the internal monitoring system are considered the most important reason for the administrative and financial corruption. It recommends that government should improve the coordination between the internal monitoring units in the different ministries, improve the used criteria of performance appraisal to make them able to measure the real level of performance, and activate the accounting system by legislating the needed laws which can define the procedures of how to deal with corruptors.

**Abo-Made, K. (2004). The Effectiveness of Control Methods in Public Institutions in Gaza Strip.**

The study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the control methods in the Palestinian public sector and how these tools are being used to improve the performance of public employees. The study used the analytical descriptive methodology with SPSS and used two questionnaires for two different samples. The first one consisted of 380 managers from the public sector institutions, and the other one consisted of 500 citizens in the Gaza Strip. The study found the Palestinian public institutions use budgets as a control tool, but this use is not effective so it affects the level of performance negatively. In addition, most of public sector's managers don't use planning in performing their tasks, or in measuring performance. The study recommends government should start staffing according to the needed qualifications instead of the political belongingness.

**Shorab, B. (2007). Evaluating the Effect Of Incentives System on Employees Performance Level in The Large Municipalities of Gaza Strip.**

The study aimed to identify the strength and weaknesses in the incentive system in the large municipalities of Gaza Strip and to explain the relationship between incentives and performance. The study used the analytical descriptive methodology with SPSS and used a questionnaire for the sample consisting of 55 employees who are working in supervision jobs. The study found that the employees are not satisfied with the incentives' system, but they respond well to un-financial incentives, although that their performance wasn't up to the needed performance to achieve goals. It recommends municipalities should pay more attention to the financial reinforcements and connect it with the results of performance appraisal only.

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### **Awad, T. (2005). Evaluation of Employees' Performance Appraisal System in the Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza strip.**

The study aimed to evaluate the performance appraisal system which is being used in the PNA and how it affects the employee's performance. The study used the analytical descriptive methodology with SPSS and used a questionnaire for the sample consisting of 520 employees from the middle managers who are working in PNA institutions in Gaza strip. The study found that there is no relationship between employee's performance appraisal and the reinforcements which he/she is going to receive and most of supervisors don't know how to deal with unacceptable behaviors or how to implement punishment policies when it's needed. It recommends that human resources departments have to give more attention to the performance appraisal process and top management should be committed to this process to make it effective, valid, and trusted.

### **Abu-Mousa, J. (2008). UNRWA's Area Staff Satisfaction on Performance Appraisal System and Its Incentives in The Gaza Field Office.**

The study aimed to identify the extent to which UNRWA's employees are satisfied by UNRWA's performance appraisal system, and how this system can affect employees' motivation level. The study used the analytical descriptive methodology with SPSS and used a questionnaire for the sample consisting of 410 employees who are working in different positions in UNRWA's Gaza field office. The study found out that UNRWA's performance appraisal system is very poor containing many mistakes and non-valid measurements. It can't reinforce employees as no real consequences depends on it and the appraisers are not qualified to appraise employee's performance. The study recommends that UNRWA should change its performance appraisal system and it has to train appraisers to appraise performance.

### **Mhesein, W. (2004). Satisfaction Level of UNRWA Employees' in Gaza Strip in Respect of Compensation and Incentives Categories.**

The study aimed to identify the satisfaction level of UNWA's employees in the Gaza strip and what variables affect it. The study used the analytical descriptive methodology with SPSS and distributed a questionnaire for the sample consisting of 254 UNRWA's employees who are working in Gaza field office. The study concluded that the level of satisfaction of UNWA's employees is very low due to the weakness in the different aspects of compensation and incentive system. The study recommends that compensations should be rebuilt again and must be linked to the increase in

cost of living in order to reach fair compensations which can create employees' commitment to the organization.

**Reinforcements and Punishments in The Palestinian Public Sector:**

The Palestinian Civil Law (2005) organizes the relationship between the public servant and the government and shows the general responsibilities and duties of the employees and their assigned functions to serve the public interest in accordance with the laws and regulations. These responsibilities and duties outline the treatments and policies that should be exercised to finalize citizens' transactions on time, to respect work schedules, and to maintain the public funds and property (Al-Qershale and Al-Hasayna, 2006).

Combating corruption is not an easy task, and whatever tool or strategy used to face it; it undertakes high efforts and costs. Countries have to handle commissions, campaigns for moral regeneration, strengthen checks on abuse of power and the enhancement of accountability, ensure transparency and openness in governmental activities, develop positive social attitudes, enforce a code of public ethics, support the role of media, and improve educational procedures (Khan, 2004). Curbing corruption needs to minimize opportunities and incentives that enhance corrupt behaviors by supporting mentoring tools and bodies (Roaf, 2000). Combating corruption by an organization whatever is its sector or type needs first of all top management's commitment (Transparency International, 2000) and that means any anticorruption strategy has to have the political will and support. One of the most important factors of effective anticorruption strategy is the legislative body in the country, as it has a significant role affects corruption level in public sector. Legislatives should be simple, clear, and transparent rules that are understood by all concerned parties (Begovic, 2005).

Despite the variety of corruption's shapes in the Palestinian public sector, the more dangerous issue is the extent to which the will is existed to face the corruption. The Palestinian public sector contains many shapes of corruption. Defalcation is still the most dangerous shape of corruption in the Palestinian public sector as it is so popular at higher levels of bureaucratic and politicians which in turn means that it is so hard to face it at the lower levels due to the weakness at the monitoring and accounting tools (Abo-arfa, 2004). Palestinian corruption can take a place as discrimination among citizens on the grounds of religion or race, mismanagement, chaos, and neglect, influence the judiciary and oversight bodies, influence public opinion with the press and the media, and abortion of democracy within the society through the falsification of elections (Abo-arfa, 2004). The types of corruption spread in the most of working areas of public sector but

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especially in purchases and tendering departments, tax and customs agencies, and departments which give license and permeations. According to the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN), the captured claims about corruption in Palestinian public sector in 2009 took place in different forms. Nepotism and favoritism ranked first by 26%, followed by embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds by 25%, then misuse of public office and public resources for personal purposes (24%), conflict of interests (21%), and illicit gain (3%) while bribery captured a rate of 1% only (AMAN, 2009).

The Palestinian corruption comes as result of many reasons including the absence of the rule of law, the weakness of judiciary system, weakness of oversight role of the legislative council, lack of involvement of civil society institutions in the fight against corruption, and finally the limitation of media's role and its refusal to participate in the response and detection of corruption cases (Abo-arfa, 2004).

Palestinians still suffer from many obstacles which hamper anti-corruption polices. First of all, the legal immunity granted to public personalities obstructs the investigations in corruption's allegations. Due to the limited coordination between the anti-corruption public prosecutions and security services and the lack of physical protection and health and social insurance for the staff working in anti-corruption agencies or their families, the acute shortage of staff, poor professional training, as well as inadequate employees' salaries with the workload and the social restrictions imposed on them, public institutions themselves can't distinguish between corruption and other crimes (AMAN, 2009). In fact, Palestinians are unable to pursue and prosecute criminals in areas beyond the PNA's control in the West Bank (AMAN, 2009). The extent to which the corruption is widespread in the Palestinian public sector is very important issue to understand the reality of corruption in Palestinian public sector. The public sector needs to be protected by the law in addition to monitoring and accounting bodies (Abo-arfa, 2004).

### **Corruption in Health Services:**

The most affected people by corruption in the health sector are the poor who can't either pay money for bribes to get health services which supposed to be free or at least at very low rate. At the same time, they cannot turn to the private health services because it is usually very expensive for such low income category of citizens in the society. The world spends three trillion dollars daily on health services, which makes the health sector very attractive for corruptors (Transparency International, 2006). These lost resources due to corruption could be used in the right way to buy medicines,

equip hospitals or hire needed qualified medical staff. Unfortunately corruption in health sector is spread all over the world. For example, the United States spends 15.3% of its GDP on health care (it's the highest percentage among the industrial countries) but 5-10 % of health's budget is lost to "overpayment." Also in Cambodia, 5% of health's budget is lost due to corruption. These amounts of money could be lost in different shapes like defalcation, theft, corruption in procurement, corruption in payment system, and corruption in the pharmaceutical supply chain (Transparency International, 2006).

**Study population and sample:**

This population was chosen for the following reasons:

- The Palestinian Ministry of Health is one of the two biggest ministries in Gaza Strip according to the employees number (Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education).
- The Ministry of Health affects people's life directly and the corrupted practices are very clear in it.
- The second category employees are the largest employee's category in the Palestinian Ministry of Health.
- The second category of employees represents the core operations in the Palestinian Ministry of Health.
- The second category employees' characteristics lie in the middle between the characteristics of the first and the third categories.
- Only one category was chosen to maintain the harmony in the questionnaire's answers.

The sample of the research was chosen on an equal probability manner, and as the population consists of 4907 employee, and in order to reach certainty level of 95% assuming that data is collected from all cases, we can calculate the size of the sample by the following equation:

$$n = p\% \times q\% \times \left[ \frac{z}{e\%} \right]^2$$

Where:  $n$  is the minimum size of the sample

$p\%$  is the proportion belonging to the specified category

$q\%$  is the proportion not belonging to the specified category

$z$  is the value of corresponding to the level of confidence required which is 1, 96 for 95% certainty

$e\%$  is the margin of error required which is 5% (Saunders and et al., 2003).

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The total population is 4907 which equals 56.44% of the total employees of the Palestinian Ministry of Health that equals 8694. The required sample's size is calculated as the following:

$$n = 56.44 \times 43.55 \times \left[ \frac{1.96}{5} \right]^2 = 378$$

But as the population is less than 10,000 and therefore a smaller sample size is used without affecting the accuracy. This is called the adjusted minimum sample size which is calculated by the following formula:

$$n' = \frac{n}{1 + \left( \frac{n}{N} \right)}$$

Where:  $n'$  is the adjusted minimum sample size

$n$  is the minimum size of the sample

$N$  is the total population (Saunders and et al., 2003).

The adjusted minimum sample size is calculated by the following formula:

$$n' = \frac{378}{1 + \left( \frac{378}{4907} \right)} = 351$$

The following equation shows the response rate:

$$\text{Total response rate} = \frac{\text{Total number of responses}}{\text{Total number in the sample} - \text{ineligible}}$$

$$\text{Total response rate} = \frac{327}{351 - 7} = 95.05\%$$

## Statistical analysis Tools

The researchers would use data analysis both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods. The Data analysis will be made utilizing (SPSS 15).

The researcher would utilize the following statistical tools:

1. Cronbach's Alpha for Reliability Statistics.
  2. Spearman and correlation for Validity.
  3. Frequency and Descriptive analysis.
  4. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality.
  5. Un Parametric Tests (Sign Test, Mann-Whitney test, Kruskal-Wallis test).
- **Sign Test** is used to determine if the mean of a paragraph is significantly different from a hypothesized value 3 (Middle value of Likert scale). If the P-value (Sig.) is smaller than or equal to the level of significance, then the mean of a paragraph is significantly different from a hypothesized value 3. The sign of the Test value indicates whether the

mean is significantly greater or smaller than hypothesized value 3. On the other hand, if the P-value (Sig.) is greater than the level of significance, then the mean of a paragraph is insignificantly different from a hypothesized value 3.

- **The Mann-Whitney Test** is used to examine if there is a statistical significant difference between two means among the respondents toward the Effect of Reinforcements & Punishments on Combating Corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due to the gender.
- **The Kruskal-Wallis Test** is used to examine if there is a statistical significant difference between several means among the respondents toward the Effect of Reinforcements & Punishments on Combating Corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due to profession, qualifications, grade, job title, years of experience in the Ministry of Health, and Income.

#### **Questionnaire's characteristics**

##### **Statistical Validity of the Questionnaire**

Validity refers to the degree to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to be measuring. Validity has a number of different aspects and assessment approaches. To insure the validity of the questionnaire, two statistical tests should be applied:

##### **1- Criterion Related Validity (Spearman Test)**

Internal consistency of the questionnaire is measured by a scouting sample, which consisted of 30 questionnaires through measuring the correlation coefficients between each paragraph in one field and the whole filed.

##### **2- Structure Validity of the Questionnaire (Spearman Test)**

Structure validity is the second statistical test that used to test the validity of the questionnaire structure by testing the validity of each field and the validity of the whole questionnaire. It measures the correlation coefficient between one filed and all the fields of the questionnaire that have the same level of liker scale.

##### **Reliability of the Research**

The reliability of an instrument is the degree of consistency that measures the attribute; which is supposed to be measuring. The less variation an instrument produces in repeated measurements of an attribute, the higher its reliability. Reliability can be equated with the stability, consistency, or dependability of a measuring tool. The test is repeated to the same sample of people on two occasions and then compares the scores obtained by computing a reliability coefficient.

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### Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha

This method is used to measure the reliability of the questionnaire between each field and the mean of the whole fields of the questionnaire. The normal range of Cronbach's coefficient alpha value between 0.0 and + 1.0, and the higher values reflects a higher degree of internal consistency. The Cronbach's coefficient alpha was calculated for each field of the questionnaire.

### Pilot Study Results:

According to the pilot study, two statements were eliminated:

- 1- The statement "The authority granted to my job allows me to impose financial punishments on subordinates as they exercise infractions" from the third field: The offered financial punishments for the employee, because the value of Spearman correlation coefficient equals 0.239 with P-value (sig.) =0.106 which is greater than the level of significance  $\alpha = 0.05$ .
- 2- The statement "The continuation of work for long periods encourage the employee to feel safe from punishment" from the fifth field: The period of experience spent in the public sector, because the value of Spearman correlation coefficient equals 0.290 with P-value (sig.) =0.060 which is greater than the level of significance  $\alpha = 0.05$ .

### Structure's Validity:

The researcher assessed the fields' structure validity by calculating the correlation coefficients of each field of the questionnaire and the whole of questionnaire.

**Table (1): Correlation coefficient of each field and the whole of questionnaire.**

No.	Field	Pearson Correlation Coefficient	P-Value (Sig.)
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	0.657	0.000*
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	0.813	0.000*
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	0.641	0.000*
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	0.608	0.000*
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	0.312	0.046*

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table (1) clarifies the correlation coefficient for each field and the whole questionnaire. The p-values (Sig.) are less than 0.05, so the correlation coefficients of all the fields are significant at  $\alpha = 0.05$ , so it can be said that

the fields are valid to measure what it was set for to achieve the main aim of the study.

**Reliability:**

**Table (2): Cronbach's Alpha for each filed of the questionnaire and the entire questionnaire.**

No.	Field	Cronbach's Alpha	Consistency*
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	0.62	0.78
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	0.66	0.81
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	0.64	0.80
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	0.73	0.85
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	0.67	0.82
<b>Total</b>		<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.85</b>

Table (2) shows the values of Cronbach's Alpha for each filed of the questionnaire and the entire questionnaire. For the fields, the values of Cronbach's Alpha are in the range from 0.62 and 0.73. This range is considered high; the result ensures the reliability of each field of the questionnaire. Cronbach's Alpha equals 0.72 for the entire questionnaire which indicates an excellent reliability of the entire questionnaire. Thereby, it can be said that the researchers proved that the questionnaire was valid, reliable, and ready for distribution for the study sample.

**Data Analysis:**

**Personal characteristics:**

Personal characteristics contain sex, profession, qualifications, grade, job title, years of experience in the Ministry of Health, and income.

**Table (3): Personal characteristics of the sample**

Personal characteristics		Frequency	Percent
<b>Gender</b>	Male	239	71.6
	Female	95	28.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>334</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Age</b>	Medicine	57	17.2
	Dentistry	4	1.2
	Nursing	90	27.2
	Medical tests	33	10.0
	Business	39	11.8

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	Accounting	35	10.6
	Others	73	22.1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Qualifications</b>	Ph.D.	12	3.6
	Master	37	11.0
	Bachelor	216	64.3
	Diploma	65	19.3
	Others	6	1.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Grade</b>	1	29	9.1
	2	42	13.2
	3	59	18.6
	4	64	20.2
	5	123	38.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>317</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Job title</b>	Deputy Director	11	3.3
	Head of Department	76	22.9
	Head of Division	48	14.5
	Doctor	54	16.3
	Nurse	54	16.3
	Technician	6	1.8
	Engineer	17	5.1
	Administrative	27	8.1
	Other	39	11.7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Years of experience</b>	Less than 5 years	169	50.1
	From 5 to 10 years	74	22.0
	more than 10 years	94	27.9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Income</b>	less than 2000 NIS	137	40.8
	from 2000 to 3000 NIS	108	32.1
	from 3000 to 4000 NIS	54	16.1
	more than 4000 NIS	37	11.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>100.0</b>

- The Palestinian Civil Law divides the public jobs into six category, which are special category, first, second, third, fourth, and fifth categories. Each category then will be divided into grades with numbers, and as the

number decreases that means the grade is higher. For example grade 1 is higher than 5 with more financial compensations and higher position (Palestinian Legislative Council, 1998).

- Taking in consideration that each Dollar equals 3.6 NIS (1 NIS = .27 \$).

**Table (4): The most effective incentives.**

Incentives	Frequency	Percent %
Monthly salary.	692	8
Promotions.	1097	12
Financial rewards.	1218	14
The nature of post in terms of authority, responsibility, and levels of supervision.	1398	16
The sense of stability and job security.	1137	13
The relationships with colleagues and supervisors.	1494	17
Insurance and pensions.	1748	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>8784</b>	<b>100.0</b>

According to Table (10), the employees of Ministry of Health considered insurance and pensions as the most important reinforcements, and the least important one is the monthly salary. The tendency shows that employees prefer to feel secured professionally on the long term rather the short term, on the other hand, the employees considered the monthly salary as the least effective incentive.

**Table (5): The most effective punishments.**

Punishments	Frequency	Percent %
Subtraction from the monthly salary.	744	16
Exclusion from promotions.	913	20
Oral scolding.	1118	24
Exclusion from the annual allowance.	1026	22
Dismissal from work.	879	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>4680</b>	<b>100.0</b>

According to Table (11), the employees of Ministry of Health considered oral scolding as the most effective punishment, and the least important one is subtraction from the monthly salary. It can be notice that employees considered un-financial punishments as effective tool to maintain the work on its track.

## The Effect of the Implemented Reinforcements

**Test of Normality: Table (6): Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality.**

Culture and performance relationship	Kolmogorov-Smirnov		
	Statistic	df	P-value
The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	0.086	333	0.000
The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	0.054	333	0.019
The offered financial punishments for the employee	0.075	333	0.000
The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	0.058	333	0.008
The period of experience spent in the public sector	0.097	333	0.000

df: Degrees of freedom

Table (12) shows the results for Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality. The p-value for each variable is smaller than 0.05, level of significance, then the distributions for these variables are non-normally distributed. Consequently, un-parametric tests will be used to perform the statistical data analysis.

### Hypotheses Testing:

**Hypothesis 1:** There is a significant relationship between financial reinforcements applied for second category employees and the corruption at level of (0.05).

**Table (7): Means and Test values for the first field.**

No	Item	Mean	Proportional mean (%)	Test value	P-value (Sig.)	Rank
1	The administration explains the financial reinforcements provided by law to the new employee.	2.54	50.72	5.92	0.000*	3
2	The administration reinforces employees financially.	1.92	38.37	13.63	0.000*	8
3	The financial reinforcements provided to employees are sufficient to do the job well.	2.36	47.23	8.90	0.000*	4
4	The annual allowance is sufficient to	2.14	42.76	11.73	0.000*	6

	motivate the employee throughout the year.					
5	The extraordinary effort is reinforced financially effectively.	1.94	38.83	12.98	0.000*	7
6	Financial reinforcements are provided according to the results of the performance appraisal with transparency and integrity.	2.18	43.53	11.31	0.000*	5
7	Nonexistence of enough financial reinforcements causes corrupted practices.	3.16	63.13	1.63	0.051*	2
8	Offering sufficient financial reinforcements fortifies an employee from corrupted practices.	3.79	75.74	11.06	0.000*	1

\* The mean is significantly different from 3

Table (13) shows the following results:

- The mean of the paragraph#8 equals 3.79 (75.74%), test-value = 11.06, and P-value = 0.000, which is smaller than the level of significance. The sign of the test is positive, so the mean of this paragraph is significantly greater than the hypothesized value 3. It can be conclude that the respondents agreed to this paragraph.

*According to the data in table (18), it can be concluded that there is a significant relationship between financial reinforcements applied for second category employees and the corruption at level of (0.05), which means that financial reinforcements have a very important effect on employees' performance.*

**Hypothesis 2:** There is a significant relationship between un-financial reinforcements applied for second category employees and the corruption at level of (0.05).

## The Effect of the Implemented Reinforcements

**Table (8): Means and Test values for the second field.**

No	Item	Mean	Proportional mean (%)	Test value	P-value (Sig.)	Rank
9	The administration explains the un-financial reinforcements provided by law to the new employee.	2.65	52.96	4.20	0.000*	7
10	The administration reinforces employees un-financially.	2.73	54.65	3.59	0.000*	5
11	The un-financial reinforcements provided to employees are sufficient to do the job well.	2.66	53.21	5.21	0.000*	6
12	Supervisors make sure from the daily stimuli as nice words, thanks, and smiles.	2.85	56.99	1.45	0.074	4
13	Supervisors encourage subordinates to participate in decision-making process.	2.88	57.54	0.30	0.381	3
14	Un-Financial reinforcements are provided according to the results of the performance appraisal with transparency and integrity.	2.63	52.67	5.52	0.000*	8
15	Nonexistence of enough un-financial reinforcements causes corrupted practices.	3.19	63.82	2.72	0.003*	2
16	Offering sufficient un-financial reinforcements fortifies an employee from corrupted practices.	3.54	70.81	8.40	0.000*	1

\* The mean is significantly different from 3

Table (14) shows the following results:

- The mean of the paragraph#16 equals 3.54 (70.81%), test-value = 8.40, and P-value = 0.000, which is smaller than the level of significance. The sign of the test is positive, so the mean of this paragraph is significantly greater than the hypothesized value 3. It can be concluded that the respondents agreed to this paragraph.

*According to the data in table (19), it can be concluded that there is a significant relationship between un-financial reinforcements applied for second category employees and the corruption at level of (0.05), which means that also un-financial reinforcements have important effect on employees' performance.*

**Hypothesis 3:** There is a significant relationship between financial punishments applied for second category employees and the corruption at level of (0.05).

**Table (9): Means and Test values for the third field.**

No	Item	Mean	Proportional mean (%)	Test value	P-value (Sig.)	Rank
17	The administration explains the financial punishments provided by law to the new employee.	2.94	58.88	0.18	0.429	4
18	The administration punishes employees financially.	3.10	61.95	1.78	0.037*	3
19	Financial punishments are sufficient deterrent to face infractions.	3.39	67.78	5.56	0.000*	2
20	Financial punishments are sufficient deterrent to face repeating of infractions.	3.48	69.55	6.73	0.000*	1
21	Legal financial punishments are implemented effectively.	2.78	55.59	4.32	0.000*	5
22	Public employee feels secured from salary subtraction exercising infractions.	2.63	52.58	6.13	0.000*	6

\* The mean is significantly different from 3

*According to the data in table (15), it can be concluded that there is a significant relationship between financial punishments applied for second category employees and the corruption at level of (0.05), which means that financial punishments must be applied as it's an effective way to prevent corruption.*

**Hypothesis 4:** There is a significant relationship between un-financial punishments applied for second category employees and the corruption at level of (0.05).

## The Effect of the Implemented Reinforcements

**Table (10): Means and Test values for the fourth field**

No.	Item	Mean	Proportional mean (%)	Test value	P-value (Sig.)	Rank
24	The administration explains the un-financial punishments provided by law to the new employee.	2.86	57.19	1.25	0.106	4
25	The administration punishes employees un-financially.	3.32	66.43	6.32	0.000*	1
26	Un-Financial punishments are sufficient deterrent to face infractions.	2.96	59.16	0.31	0.378	3
27	Un-Financial punishments are sufficient deterrent to face repeating of infractions.	2.98	59.64	0.06	0.475	2
28	Legal un-financial punishments are implemented effectively.	2.78	55.60	3.79	0.000*	5
29	Public employee feels secured from dismissal due to exercising infractions.	2.49	49.79	6.59	0.000*	7
30	The authority granted to my job allows me to impose financial punishments on subordinates as they exercise infractions.	2.54	50.90	6.31	0.000*	6

\* The mean is significantly different from 3

*According to the data in table (16), it can be concluded that there is a significant relationship between un-financial punishments applied for second category employees and the corruption at level of (0.05), which means that also un-financial punishments could be used as effective tool to prevent corruption.*

**Hypothesis 5:** There is a significant relationship between the period of experience spent in the public sector and the corrupted practices of the employee at level of (0.05%).

**Table (11): Means and Test values for the fifth field.**

No	Item	Mean	Proportional mean (%)	Test value	P-value (Sig.)	Rank
31	The more years of work in the public sector the more infractions by employee.	2.39	47.87	9.61	0.000*	4
33	Employee gains the ability to exercise infractions during the work in the public sector.	2.67	53.43	5.19	0.000*	2
34	By time, employees build corrupted collectives.	2.63	52.50	6.29	0.000*	3
35	By time, employee's enthusiasm to fight corruption decreases.	3.01	60.12	0.00	0.500	1

\* The mean is significantly different from 3

According to the data in table (17), it can be concluded that there is a significant relationship between the period of experience spent in the public sector and the corrupted practices of the employee at level of (0.05%), which means that employees' behaviors are affected by their interaction with each other, also they change by time.

**Hypothesis 6:** There is a significant relationship between the personal differences and the corrupted practices of the employee at level of (0.05%).

**This hypothesis can be split into the following sub-hypotheses.**

**A- There is a significant difference among the respondents toward the effect of reinforcements and punishments on combating corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due to the gender.**

**Table (12): Mann-Whitney test of the fields and their p-values for gender**

No	Field	Test value	P-value(Sig.)
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	-0.255	0.799
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	-0.081	0.936
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	-0.555	0.579
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	-0.024	0.981
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	-2.198	0.028

\* The mean difference is significant a 0, 05 level.

## The Effect of the Implemented Reinforcements

**B- There is a significant difference among the respondents toward the effect of reinforcements and punishments on combating corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due to profession.**

**Table (13): Kruskal-Wallis test of the fields and their p-values for Profession.**

No	Field	Test Value	df	Sig.
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	17.430	6	0.008*
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	32.710	6	0.000*
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	10.057	6	0.122
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	11.959	6	0.063
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	8.590	6	0.198

- The mean difference is significant a 0, 05 level.

**Table (14): Mean rank for each field for profession.**

No	Fields	Mean Rank						
		Medicine	Dentistry	Nursing	Medical tests	Business	Accounting	Other (specify)
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	136.78	96.13	161.05	138.86	200.05	185.70	174.35
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	115.46	68.88	173.51	140.52	209.33	184.46	170.10
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	142.10	119.38	167.33	157.95	196.63	181.80	160.72
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	137.74	114.00	168.99	149.38	198.63	168.21	169.21
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	182.85	70.38	172.88	149.56	159.05	165.94	154.36

Table (20) shows the mean rank for each field of the questionnaire. The mean rank for Business is higher than other.

**C- There is a significant difference among the respondents toward the effect of reinforcements and punishments on combating corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due to qualifications.**

**Table (15): Kruskal-Wallis test of the fields and their p-values for Qualifications.**

No	Field	Test Value	df	Sig.
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	20.843	4	0.000*
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	9.969	4	0.041*
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	11.382	4	0.023*
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	17.203	4	0.002*
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	4.614	4	0.329

\* The mean difference is significant a 0, 05 level.

**Table (16): Mean rank for each field for Qualifications.**

No	Fields	Mean Rank				
		Ph.D.	Master	Bachelor	Diploma	Others
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	91.92	134.79	166.92	187.20	266.92
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	105.79	141.14	167.44	185.32	178.25
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	131.79	127.07	172.55	175.07	226.17
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	115.46	118.88	174.51	171.91	237.67
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	181.17	169.32	160.58	186.95	137.67

Table (22) shows the mean rank for each field for Qualifications. The mean rank for others qualifications is higher than other.

## The Effect of the Implemented Reinforcements

**D- There is a significant difference among the respondents toward the effect of reinforcements and punishments on combating corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due grade.**

**Table (17): Kruskal-Wallis test of the fields and their p-values for Grade.**

No	Field	Test Value	df	Sig.
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	1.417	4	0.841
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	12.058	4	0.017*
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	3.765	4	0.439
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	12.291	4	0.015*
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	0.486	4	0.975

\* The mean difference is significant a 0, 05 level

**Table (18): Mean rank for each field for Grade.**

No	Fields	Mean Rank				
		1	2	3	4	5
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	154.09	149.83	156.03	150.18	164.12
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	134.34	145.29	144.69	143.82	178.90
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	148.20	149.27	146.02	156.47	169.66
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	115.84	148.73	152.59	149.55	176.36
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	158.84	156.39	153.14	153.99	161.52

Table (24) shows the mean rank for each field for grade. The mean rank for grade 5 is higher than others.

**E- There is a significant difference among the respondents toward the effect of reinforcements and punishments on combating corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due to job title.**

**Table (19): Kruskal-Wallis test of the fields and their p-values of Job title.**

No	Field	Test Value	df	Sig.
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	26.043	8	0.001*
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	20.321	8	0.009*
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	4.486	8	0.811
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	9.948	8	0.269
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	4.473	8	0.812

\* The mean difference is significant a 0,05 level

**Table (20): Mean rank for each field of job title.**

No	Fields	Mean Rank						
		Medicine	Dentistry	Nursing	Medical tests	Business	Accounting	Other (specify)
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	136.78	96.13	161.05	138.86	200.05	185.70	174.35
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	115.46	68.88	173.51	140.52	209.33	184.46	170.10
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	142.10	119.38	167.33	157.95	196.63	181.80	160.72
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	137.74	114.00	168.99	149.38	198.63	168.21	169.21
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	182.85	70.38	172.88	149.56	159.05	165.94	154.36

Table (26) shows the mean rank for each field for job title. The mean rank for Engineer is higher than others.

**F- There is a significant difference among the respondents toward the effect of reinforcements and punishments on combating corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due to years of experience.**

## The Effect of the Implemented Reinforcements

**Table (21): Kruskal-Wallis test of the fields and their p-values for work.**

No	Field	Test Value	df	Sig.
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	5.804	2	0.055
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	7.511	2	0.023
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	6.222	2	0.045
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	7.901	2	0.019*
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	15.579	2	0.000*

\* The mean difference is significant at 0, 05 level.

**Table (22): Mean rank for each field for work.**

No	Fields	Mean Rank		
		Less than 5 years	From 5 to 10 years	more than 10 years
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	177.77	166.82	147.81
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	180.03	160.90	146.75
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	174.92	178.86	146.90
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	177.41	175.00	143.68
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	186.20	162.70	137.49

Table (28) shows the mean rank for each field for work. The mean rank for less than 5 years is higher than others.

**G- There is a significant difference among the respondents toward the Effect of reinforcements and punishments on combating corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health due to Income.**

**Table (23): Kruskal-Wallis test of the fields and their p-values for income.**

No	Field	Test Value	df	Sig.
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	15.457	3	0.001*
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	22.121	3	0.000*
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	6.504	3	0.090
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	14.034	3	0.003*
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	4.44	3	0.217

\* The mean difference is significant at 0, 05 level.

**Table (24): Mean rank for each field for income.**

No	Fields	Mean Rank			
		less than 2000 NIS	from 2000 to 3000 NIS	from 3000 to 4000 NIS	more than 4000 NIS
1	The offered financial reinforcements for the employee	186.46	162.45	155.38	119.53
2	The offered un-financial reinforcements for the employee	190.90	160.39	149.91	113.00
3	The offered financial punishments for the employee	177.91	168.54	162.62	132.96
4	The offered un-financial punishments for the employee	178.85	174.82	155.90	115.01
5	The period of experience spent in the public sector	179.51	155.17	166.06	155.94

Table (30) shows the mean rank for each field for income. The mean rank for less than 2000 NIS is higher than others.

*According to results of sub-hypothesis, it can be concluded that there is a significant relationship between the personal differences and the corrupted practices of the employee at level of (0.05%), which means that employees' trend towards corruption differs due to personal characteristics.*

**Results:**

In the light of the results of the empirical study, it can be included the following:

- 1- The offered reinforcements and punishments for the employees seem not sufficient to maintain the work of the Palestinian Ministry of Health in the needed level of performance and this similar to the study of Al-Aksh (2007) .
- 2- The Palestinian Ministry of Health doesn't impose financial and un-financial punishments regularly; in addition to that employees consider these punishments are not enough to prevent corruptors from undertaking infractions and this is matching with the study of Abo-Made (2004).

### **The Effect of the Implemented Reinforcements**

- 3- The financial reinforcements are strong fortifications for corrupted behaviors, and the absence of different types of reinforcements increase corruption.
- 4- The financial punishments are strong tool on combating corruption at its different stages and this is similar with the study of Kolab (2004).
- 5- Although the years of experience don't affect the employee's attitude toward corruption, employee's enthusiasm to fight corruption decreases by time.
- 6- Personal differences have limited effect on the employee's attitude toward corruption, but differences among grades and job titles have an obvious effect.
- 7- The Palestinian Ministry of Health doesn't explain the offered types of reinforcements or punishments to its new employees, and most of the employees know nothing about the different aspects of the Palestinian Civil Law which organizes and regulates the relationship between them and their work and this is matching the study of Awad (2005).
- 8- The Palestinian Ministry of Health doesn't reinforce its employees enough whether financially or un-financially to do their own job well and this is matching with the study of Shorab (2007).
- 9- The different types of punishments are not applied effectively in the Palestinian Ministry of Health which, in turn, affects the level of corruption in its performance and operations.
- 10- Reinforcements and punishments in the Palestinian Ministry of Health are not introduced according to the yearly performance appraisal report this is matching the study of Awad (2005).

### **Recommendations:**

In light of the aforementioned results, the following points are recommended:

- 1- The Palestinian Ministry of Health has to revise its offered reinforcement policy for its employees to keep its services up to the planned level.
- 2- The Palestinian Ministry of Health has to start imposing punishment policy in the needed cases, and develop the methods and techniques of punishments.
- 3- The Palestinian Ministry of Health has to start using financial reinforcement policy as a strong tool in combating corruption.
- 4- The Palestinian Ministry of Health has to start using punishment policy more effectively as a strong tool in combating corruption.
- 5- The Palestinian Ministry of Health must offer reinforcements according to the performance appraisal reports, to maintain fairness and justice.

- 6- The Palestinian Ministry of Health has to reinforce employee's attitudes against corruption by encouraging employee's notifications about corruption cases and protect them.
- 7- The Palestinian Ministry of Health has to improve its response to employees' performance during the year, and not only at the end of the year.

**Suggested Further Studies:**

According to authors' knowledge, this is the first study to be conducted on the effect of reinforcements and punishments in combating corruption in the Palestinian Ministry of Health. This field of research is completely new and deserves more exploration in the Palestinian society. Therefore, the following future studies are suggested:

- 1- The validity and reliability of the performance appraisal system adopted by the Palestinian Ministry of Health and other ministries.
- 2- The validity and reliability of reinforcements and punishments system adopted by the Palestinian Ministry of Health.
- 3- Corruption channels in the Palestinian Ministry of Health in particular and in PNA institutions in general.

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